Michigan Law Review
Volume 102

Issue 5

2004

Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb and Swire
Orin S. Kerr
George Washington University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and
the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Orin S. Kerr, Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb and Swire, 102 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2004).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol102/iss5/4

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY, AND THE
COURTS: A REPLY TO COLB AND SWIRE
Orin S. Kerr*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
REPLY TO PROFESSOR COLB ............... ....... ...... ............. ..... ........ 933

I.
II.

REPLY TO PROFESSOR SWIRE .............. ....... ... ............................. 936
CONCLUSION ................. ........ ............................................ ....................... 943
I thank Sherry Colb and Peter Swire for devoting their time and
considerable

talents

to

responding

to

my

article,

The

Fourth

Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution. I will conclude with a few comments.
I.

REPLY TO PROFESSOR COLB

I very much enjoyed reading Professor Colb's response, although I
think at times it misunderstands my article. To clarify, my article does
not present a defense of the physical-trespass test in Fourth
Amendment law; it does not answer how the Fourth Amendment
should apply to a hypothetical brain-wave recorder; it does not argue
that the use of property principles is proper in light of originalist or
other theories of constitutional interpretation; and it does not claim
that there should be no role for the Fourth Amendment in cases that
involve developing technologies.1 My article does not endorse any
particular Fourth Amendment test, and has nothing positive to say
about the pre-Jones physical-trespass approach. I do note that
property concepts appear with surprising regularity when judges

* Associate Professor of Law, GeorgeWashington University Law School. B.S.E. 1993,
Princeton University; M.S. 1994, Stanford University; J.D. 1997, Harvard Law School. - Ed.
I thank the editors of the Michigan Law Review for giving me the opportunity to reply.
1. But see Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the
Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 888, 890
(2004) (" The appropriate question is whether courts have (and whether they ought to have)
an obligation to apply the Fourth Amendment to new technologies that could invade privacy
without physically trespassing on anyone's private property. Kerr answers this question
no . . . . ); id. at 888-89 (arguing that my analysis would find no constitutional limitations on
the use of a hypothetical "brain wave recorder"); id. at 893-94 (arguing that an originalist
should interpret the Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy instead of property); id. at 901
(describing my normative position as " Kerr's argument that Congress alone should be
entrusted with protecting privacy").
"
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interpret the Fourth Amendment. Even when purporting to protect
privacy, judges have proven reluctant to deviate from rules based on
principles of property law. I make this argument not to endorse
property law as a specific normative principle of interpretation, but
rather to show how courts have interpreted the post-Katz Fourth
Amendment in a narrow way with important ramifications for the
Fourth Amendment in new technologies. We can debate why this is
so: my own suspicion is that judges understand property concepts, but
have no common framework for assessing and evaluating privacy
claims.2 Whatever the reason, I have no necessary sympathy for the
property approach. I argue that judicial modesty has important virtues
in this area, but such modesty can be achieved under a privacy
approach as well.3
More broadly, my article presents a pragmatic case for judicial
caution in the face of rapid technological change, not a defense of
property law as a guide for interpreting the Fourth Amendment. It
attempts to bring about a greater awareness of the role of statutory
privacy laws and the gap between the perception and reality of where
privacy rights governing new technologies originate. While scholars
focus on the Constitution, the primary privacy protections regulating
new technologies have come from Congress. To be sure, this may be
the kind of technical and arcane issue that only a law professor could
find interesting; as Professor Colb notes, most people care about
whether their privacy is protected, not what branch of government
confers that protection.4 But for readers concerned with the structure
and contour of privacy laws, I offer a pragmatist case for why we
should focus more on statutory protections and less on developing
theories of constitutional protection. Fourth Amendment history,
doctrine, and the institutional limitations of the courts suggest that the

2. Nor do privacy law scholars, for that matter. A rather large percentage of scholarship
in the area of privacy law is focused on trying to determine the meaning of privacy. See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) (reviewing the
many different understandings of privacy and offering another understanding of what
privacy means).
3. Peter S wire's article provides a helpful reminder that a privacy-focused regime does
not necessarily lead to a more protective Fourth Amendment regime than a property
focused regime. See Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz., MICH. L. REV. 904, 910
(2004) (arguing that "courts have clung to the property approach to assist the government"
and elsewhere has used "[t]he end of the property regime . . . [as] a sword for the
government, not a shield of personal privacy"); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a 'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?',
33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 512-13 (2001) (noting that rights-based conceptions of the Fourth
Amendment can lead to broader protections than privacy-based conceptions of the Fourth
Amendment). I mostly disagree with the examples S wire relies upon - in particular, I see
third-party conveyance cases such as United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), as property
cases - but the key point survives that it is possible to have a low-protection privacy regime.
4. See Colb, supra note 1, at 890.
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vital work of protecting privacy in response to technological change
will come more from Congress than from the courts.
Colb makes two interesting practical arguments against judicial
caution. First, she suggests that judicial deference is unnecessary
because even broad judicial privacy protection would not overprotect
privacy interests.5 I understand Colb's argument as one of substantive
preference: Colb greatly values privacy, and she calculates that within
the set of feasible outcomes more privacy will always be better.
Because the courts are unlikely to interpret the Fourth Amendment in
a way that provides more privacy than Colb would want, there is no
harm if the courts interpret the Fourth Amendment broadly.6 In my
view, the problem

with

this

argument is that it overlooks the

difficulties judges face when they craft privacy rules regulating
developing technologies. Colb may be right that most judges will not
intentionally create rules that are more privacy protecting than she
would want. But attempts to protect privacy can backfire, and the
context of judicial rulemaking makes missteps particularly likely. As a
result, judicially crafted rules are particularly likely to have
unintended consequences that even a privacy-valuing observer would
dislike. Consider Judge Magnuson's holding in United States v. Bach1
that the Fourth Ame-ndment requires a law-enforcement officer be
physically present whenever an internet service provider ("ISP")
responds to a search warrant for information on its servers.8 Judge
Magnuson believed that his rule would protect privacy, but his failure
to understand the relevant technology created a mismatch between his
values and the effect of the resulting rule. If the Eighth Circuit had not
overturned his decision, Magnuson's rule either would have slowed
investigations considerably without any benefit to privacy or else
required police officers to be stationed permanently at ISPs. It is hard
to see how either outcome would achieve the goal of protecting
privacy.
Colb also argues that Congress may be unable to protect privacy
adequately because it may lack the constitutional authority to do so.9 I
think

her concern

is

overstated.

Colb's

analysis

overlooks

the

expansive reach of the modern Commerce Clause, which provides
broad authority to regulate the use of developing technologies. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to give
Congress essentially unlimited power over instruments of interstate

5. See Colb, supra note 1, at 900.
6. Id.
7. No. Crim.01-221, 2001WL 1690055 ( D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2001).
8. See id. at * 3.

9. Colb, supra note 1, at 900-01.
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commerce such as communications networks.10 As a practical matter,
this means that Congress can regulate anything connected to the
Intemet.11 In addition, lower courts for the most part have allowed
Congress to regulate the use of technological instruments that have
traveled in interstate commerce prior to their use.12 For example, use
of a camera to create images of child pornography can be regulated by
Congress if the camera or film has traveled in interstate or
international commerce.13 This theory permits Congress to regulate
the use of nearly every camera and all film. If upheld by the Supreme
Court, it would allow Congress to regulate the use of new technologies
by state and local governments without any significant limits. Because
nearly every technological tool travels across state lines prior to its
use, it seems likely based on existing law that Congress can regulate
technological instruments under the Commerce Clause.
II.

REPLY TO PROFESSOR SWIRE

Professor Swire's thoughtful article offers a series of arguments in
support of a strong role for the courts in the protection of privacy
involving developing technologies. Swire's first argument is that
constitutional privacy protections are necessary because they tend to
be stronger than statutory protections. According to Swire, statutory

10. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding interstate
commerce element in child-pornography statutes was established when Government linked
images to the Internet); United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating
that "[t]ransmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving
photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce");
United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 706-09 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding interstate-commerce
element in obscenity statutes was satisfied where pornographic material sent via the
Internet); United States v. Kelly, No. 99-10100-0 1, 2000 WL 433093, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 2,
2000) ("Assuming, as defendant contends, that the facility and means used in this case was a
computer with a modem connected via phone lines to the internet, the court concludes that
this would clearly be a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to permit Congress to
regulate it.").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a) (4)(B) under the Commerce Clause). 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B) (2000) makes it a
felony crime to
knowingly possess[] 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other
matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which
have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if -

(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; and

(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct ....

Id. (emphasis added).

13. See Rodia, 194 F.3d at 479 (upholding the statute under the Commerce Clause). But
see United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting this theory).
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privacy protections are weak and constantly shrinking because the
Justice Department controls the legislative process.14 In contrast,
constitutional protections once established remain stable and strong.15
As a descriptive matter, however, I am not convinced that this is true.
It seems to me that both statutory and constitutional privacy
protections on average tend toward a middle ground. Supreme Court
decisions establishing strong Fourth Amendment protection tend to
be followed by other decisions that temper the initial rule. For
example, the Supreme Court's expansion of the exclusionary rule to
the States in Mapp v. Ohio16 was followed by a series of decisions
minimizing the scope of exclusion, both through good-faith exceptions
for warrants17 and new exceptions to the warrant requirement.18
Perhaps Katz itself is an example: the promise of broad protection in
Katz was followed by a series of cases construing it narrowly. Through

repeated case-by-case decisions, the courts eventually work their way
toward some sort of middle ground level of protection.
Contrary to Swire's suggestion, I think that statutory protections
also tend to reach a middle ground. If there is a general trend toward
lesser statutory protection over time, it is not clear to me. Swire
focuses on the fact that Congress did not act on an Internet privacy bill
that the House Judiciary Committee approved in 2000, but then
passed the USA Patriot Act in 2001. To Swire, this suggests that the
legislative process is broken: Congress passed (bad) pro-government
legislation but not (good) pro-privacy legislation, leading to less
privacy.19 I find it difficult to draw a lesson from this example. It is
worth noting, however, that in Swire's own example the legislative
process rejected FBI and DOJ proposals and instead attempted to
push the law in a strongly pro-privacy direction. Then, when Congress
passed some of the proposals a few years later, it did so only under
remarkable circumstances and even then only subject to a sunset
provision.20 If Swire's example is supposed to show a trend toward

14. Swire, supra note 3, at 919-20.
15. Id. at 916 (" Fourth Amendment cases generally offer a sharp yes/no choice between
two positions. If the government action is a 'search,' then there are relatively strict rules. A
neutral magistrate must decide whether 'probable cause' has been shown.").
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982).
19. See Swire supra note 3, at 914-15.
20. The pro-privacy bill that S wire mentions is House Bill 5018, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 2000, which began as a Clinton administration initiative to
update the Internet privacy laws. At that time, the House Judiciary Committee was
controlled by Republican Bob Barr. The House Judiciary Committee under Barr
transformed the bill. As Swire acknowledges, the committee "overwhelmingly amended [the
proposal] in the direction of greater privacy protections." See Swire supra note 3, at 915.
Indeed, the bill that emerged would have shifted the rules rather dramatically in a pro-
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lessening privacy protection over time, then it is at best a mixed signal.
More broadly, the privacy/security pendulum swings both ways; while
there may be times of crisis when the pendulum swings in favor of law
enforcement, there are other periods when the pendulum swings in
favor of privacy. I would pose this question to Swire: if there is a
systematic tendency toward greater surveillance, in what year was
privacy most protected by the legislative process? In 1960, when
federal law did not forbid wiretapping? In 1970, before PISA was
enacted? In 1980, before Congress passed ECPA?
More broadly, comparing privacy protections at different times is
more difficult than Swire acknowledges. Law, technology, and social
practices interact in complicated ways, and changes in law often
respond to changes in technology and social practice. Whether you
identify a trend in one direction or another depends in part on
whether you look primarily to law in isolation or to the interaction of
law with social practice and technology. When emerging technologies
make surveillance easier and new legal protections are proposed to
counter them, those concerned with privacy can look to technology
and social practice and identify a decrease in privacy protections. At
the same time, those concerned with public safety can look at the law
in isolation and argue that the proposed amendments would impose
greater restrictions than ever before.21 The strategies flip when
technology makes surveillance harder, and the issue turns to whether
the law should change to restore some lost powers. Law enforcement
advocates will tend to look at technology and social practice and see a
threat to effective investigations, while privacy advocates will tend to
focus on the law in isolation and argue that the proposed amendment
would give the government unprecedented new authority.22 This does
not mean it is impossible to make overall measurements of how much

privacy direction by raising privacy thresholds and imposing suppression remedies in nearly
every context of communications-network crime investigations. For example, the law would
have imposed a statutory suppression remedy for intercepted Internet communications, see
H.R. 5018, 106th Cong. § 2 (a)- (b) (2000), raised the threshold for obtaining pen register
orders, see H.R. 5018 § 4, imposed a warrant requirement on cell phone location
information, see H.R. 5018 § 7, and extended the warrant requirement from only unopened
email to protect all email, see H.R. 5018 § 13. This change in direction scuttled the bill:
privacy advocates were skeptical because the bill contained some pro-government measures
and had been supported by the Clinton Administration, and law-enforcement interests
opposed the bill because on the whole it represented a substantial shift to ward greater
regulation of law enforcement.
21. Consider S wire's discussion of ho w the law should respond to changes in technology
as telephone communications are routed over the Internet. Here he focuses on ho w
advancing technology lessens privacy under the assumption of stable legal rules. See S wire,
supra note 3, at 910-15.
22. We have seen this debate in the context of debates over the use of encryption and
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (" CALEA"), codified at
47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1021 (2000). See Dan Eggen & Jonathan Krim, Easier Internet Wiretaps
Sought, N.Y. TIMES March 13, 2004, at Al.
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privacy the law provides at different times. But it does mean that
effective comparisons across time are difficult to make.
Swire suggests that statutory protections tend to be weak because
the Justice Department controls the legislative process, but fails to
identify a persuasive reason why legislators should listen to law
enforcement interests beyond the legislators' interest in satisfying
public preferences.23 Swire draws on the insight that concentrated
groups can influence legislation more than dispersed groups,24 but his
concern is addressed by the existence of the influential privacy groups
that represent privacy interests in legislative debates in Congress.
Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), the
Center for Democracy and Technology, and the Electronic Privacy
Information

Center

have

considerable

sway

on

Capitol

Hill.

Mainstream press outlets such as the New York Times and the
Washington Post provide extensive coverage of surveillance and
privacy issues that on the whole tends to be wary of government
claims and sympathetic to privacy concerns.25 As I have noted
elsewhere, law-enforcement groups and privacy groups are the "two
important constituencies

that exert a significant influence

over

Congress in this area."26 As a practical matter, "few changes in
[privacy statutes involving new technologies] can pass through
Congress without at least the support of one of these sides and the
grudging acquiescence of the other."27
I don't wish to paint an overly rosy picture of Congress and the
legislative process. At the federal level, the constitutional structure
gives

law-enforcement

agencies

an

important

advantage

in

congressional negotiations in the form of the presidential veto power.28
Law-enforcement powers are executive-branch powers, and most
presidents will be more willing to expand executive-branch powers

23. As Williams Stuntz has argued in the context of substantive criminal law, legislators
have legitimate reasons to pay attention to Jaw-enforcement interests:
That natural alliance (of interest between legislators and law-enforcement groups) should
make prosecutors (along with police) a very powerful lobby on criminal law issues. If police
and prosecutors want some new criminal prohibition, they likely want it because it would
advance their goals. Advancing police and prosecutors' goals usually means advancing
legislators' goals as well. Thus, legislators have good reason to listen when prosecutors urge
some statutory change.
Willam J. Stuntz,

The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100

M ICH . L. REV.

505, 534

(2001).
24. Cf

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).

25. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607 (2003).
26. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the 'Fog' of Internet Surveillance: How A Suppression Remedy
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 837 (2003).
27. Id.
28. See U . S . CONST.

art

I, § 7.
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than reduce them. This dynamic allows· presidents to use threats
of vetoes (and in unusual cases, vetoes themselves) as tools to
block legislative enactments that law enforcement interests view as
threatening. If, over time, the veto threat creates an institutional bias
in legislation in favor of law-enforcement interests, that may create an
important role for the judiciary to play. In effect, the judicial branch
could act as a counter to the executive branch; while a President could
use the veto power to nullify legislation that excessively narrows
executive power, the courts could use their power of judicial review to
nullify legislation that excessively broadens it.
One interesting way in which the courts might respond to this
dynamic is through statutory rather than constitutional interpretation.
When interpreting statutory text, judges could place a 'thumb on the
scale' in favor of privacy interests. The combination of judicial caution
in the constitutional area and judicial boldness in the statutory area
might lead to an optimal solution. Courts could further Fourth
Amendment

values

by

protecting

privacy

through

statutory

construction. Judicial pressure in statutory cases would keep Congress
on its toes, encouraging

Congress to enact clear and carefully

articulated statutory standards. At the same time, the courts would
rest final authority for the scope of privacy protection (within some
constitutional bound) with the governmental body best suited to craft
privacy protections in new technologies - the legislature.
There is a history supporting just such an approach. Consider the
Supreme Court's pro-privacy reading of the first permanent federal
29
wiretapping statute, Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.
As a textual matter, Section 605 appears to be only a criminal
prohibition on private wiretapping; it says nothing about wiretapping
by government agents or remedies beyond criminal punishment. In
1937, however, the Court interpreted the law in Nardone v. United
States3° to apply to federal officers and also to serve an evidentiary

function: according to the Court, the statute made all wiretapping
evidence inadmissible in federal court.31 The Court relied in part on
policy considerations:
For years controversy has raged with respect to the morality of the
practice of wire-tapping by officers to obtain evidence. It has been the
view of many that the practice involves a grave wrong. In the light of
these circumstances we think another well recognized principle leads to
the application of the statute as it is written so as to include within its
32
sweep federal officers as well as others.

29. 47 u.s.c. § 605 (2000).
30. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
31. Id. at 384.
32. Id.
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Three years later, the Court expanded that holding in the second
Nardone v. United States33 to require the exclusion of "fruit of the

poisonous tree" of illegal wiretapping.34 The Court relied explicitly on
the need to protect privacy: "two opposing

concerns must be

harmonized: on the one hand, the stem enforcement of the criminal
law; on the other, protection of that realm of privacy left free by
Constitution and laws but capable of infringement either through zeal
or design."35 Just a decade after the Court declined to regulate
wiretapping under the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead, it opted for
aggressive pro-privacy readings of the statutory wiretapping law in the
Nardone cases.

Other courts have suggested that statutory privacy laws should be
construed broadly. Consider a few excerpts from decided cases on the
various federal statutory privacy laws. On the Privacy Act: "[T]he
Privacy Act's protection is to be broadly construed. "36 On the Wiretap
Act: "When considering a statute designed to protect privacy, a court
must be reluctant to give expansive reading to the exceptions."37 On
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act: "In these days of 'big
brother,'

where

through technology

and

otherwise

the

privacy

interests of individuals from all walks of life are being ignored or
marginalized, it is imperative that statutes explicitly protecting these
rights be strictly observed."38 Such examples may not in isolation
amount to an existing canon in favor of construing privacy statutes
broadly. At the same time, such a canon may permit judges to pursue
constitutional values without the institutional difficulties of a judge
based privacy regime when technology is in flux.
I am less persuaded by some of the other arguments that Professor
Swire makes. For example, Swire argues that the courts should
interpret the Fourth Amendment expansively because a strong Fourth
Amendment will facilitate the public debate over statutory privacy
laws. While congressional debates may sometimes be inspired by
constitutional discourse, I doubt that this inspiration hinges on the
actual scope of the privacy protection the courts establish or the
precise tests that they endorse. After all, Brandeis and Warren's "right
to be let alone" is justly celebrated and oft-cited in legislative debates

33. 308 U.S. 338, 34 1 ( 1939).
34. Id. at 341. This case introduced the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine later
adopted in the Fourth Amendment context: "[T]he trial judge must give opportunity,
ho wever closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case
against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." Id.
35. Id. at 340.
36. Martin v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 775, 780 ( Fed. Cl. 1983).
37. Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815, 820 ( N.D. Ill. 1981).
38. McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 2 15, 220 (D.D.C. 1998).

942

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 102:933

in favor of increased privacy protections, but no one seems to
remember or care that the Supreme Court rejected this approach in
Katz v. United States.39

Similarly, Swire agrees that decisions rejecting Fourth Amendment
protection have inspired congressional action in the past, but argues
that this is unlikley to occur again in the future.40 According to Swire,
"[t]he triumph of the jurisprudence of United States v. Miller and
Smith v. Maryland suggests little room for new decisions by the

Supreme Court that would prompt congressional action."41 I disagree.
Smith and Miller are hotly contested cases, and even when read

broadly they concern only the narrow question of whether third-party
possession eliminates Fourth Amendment protection. There are good
reasons not to read these cases broadly, among them the recent
decision in Kyllo.42 Given this, I think it likely that lower courts will
divide

on

technologies

how

the

ranging

Fourth
from

Amendment
computer

applies
files

to

to

emerging

cell

phone

communications, and that the Supreme Court will eventually address
at least some of them. Supreme Court decisions involving any of these
technologies will trigger vigorous legislative activity.
Swire is also too quick to dismiss the judiciary's lack of expertise.
According to Swire, judges can overcome their institutional difficulties
through the use of expert testimony, review of opinion polls, and a
close study of relevant statutory privacy laws.43 None are likely to be
helpful. To the extent that Swire imagines judges trying to identify and
match constitutional protections to majoritarian preferences, it is
unclear why we cannot leave such matters to the elected branches.
Expert testimony is unlikely to help much because most Fourth
Amendment questions arise in the context of a motion to suppress,
rather than a civil trial between well-financed adversaries. Defense
attorneys will only rarely find it worthwhile to educate a judge about a
technology, and judges will only rarely think that they need to be so
educated. Finally, many of the relevant questions are beyond even an
expert's knowledge. Such questions include: How will the use of a
given technology evolve over time? What would be the consequences
of a particular rule? These are not the types of questions that technical
experts are well equipped to answer.

39. 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 ( 1967).
40. Swire, supra note 3, at 917.
4 1. Id. (citations omitted).
42. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Orin S.
Kerr, United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02- 1238), at http://w ww.epic.
org/privacy/bach/kerr_amicus.pdf (exploring precedents in support of both high Fourth
Amendment protection and low Fourth Amendment protection for stored email held by an
Internet service provider).
43. See S wire, supra note 3, at 924.
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CONCLUSION
In my article, I predict that we may be moving toward a bifurcated
regime in which privacy rights in traditional cases are constitutional
but rights in developing technologies are largely statutory. This is an
easy prediction to make in some ways, for it is a fairly accurate
description of the law today. Professors Swire and Colb each want the
courts to reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment, and argue that the
courts must and can assume a vigorous role regulating the use of
emerging technologies. Whether the courts follow a bold or more
modest path, I hope both Colb and Swire will agree that in the
foreseeable future Congress will continue to play an essential role.
Whatever balance is struck between constitutional and statutory
privacy, we should recognize that statutory laws should not remain an
afterthought. If scholars wish to remain relevant to the law in action,
we should focus on Congress and appreciate the possibilities of
statutory law as a source of privacy protection in new technologies.

